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Abstract 
While there is a relatively extensive literature concerning the nature of smart cities in general, the roles of 
corporate actors in their production, and the development and deployment of specific smart city 
technologies, to date there have been relatively few studies that have examined the situated practices as to 
how the smart city as a whole unfolds in specific places. In this paper, we chart the smart city ecosystem 
in Dublin, Ireland, and examine how the four city authorities have actively collaborated to progressively 
frame and mobilise an articulated vision of Dublin as a smart city. In particular, we focus on the work of 
‘Smart Dublin’, a shared unit established to coordinate, manage and promote Dublin’s smart city 
initiatives. We argue that Smart Dublin has on the one hand sought to corral smart city initiatives within a 
common framework, and on the other has acted to boost the city-region’s smart city activities, especially 
with respect to economic development. Our analysis highlights the value of undertaking a holistic 
mapping of a smart city in formation, and the role of political and administrative geographies and 
specialist smart city units in shaping that formation.  
 
Key words: smart city, governance, Smart Dublin, test-bedding, procurement by challenge, SBIR, 
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Introduction 
A somewhat ambiguous term, ‘smart city’ is now at the vanguard of concepts concerning urban 
development, replacing and incorporating a series of precursors that included the wired city, the 
innovation city, digital city, the intelligent city, and the creative city (Hollands 2008; Kitchin 
2014). The term denotes something inherently positive, for who can be for the ‘dumb city’? It 
also suggests more than the embedding of digital technologies in urban infrastructures and their 
deployment to manage cities more effectively, hinting at the clever entwining and integration of 
systems used to govern cities, enabling the ‘breaking down of silos’, ‘joined-up thinking’ and 
‘data-driven, real-time control’, thus creating efficiencies and improved services. Importantly, 
the notion of a smart city is not confined to the operations of local government, with individuals 
gaining access to smartness through a plethora of smartphone-delivered industry- or citizen-
created apps and services that provide information and enable choice and decision-making on the 
move, and privately delivered services (such as smart metering and smart parking). Data from 
these individuals, and the technologies they interact with, can in turn feedback into the operation 
of the city through citizen-sensing and crowdsourced reporting (Gabrys 2014).  
While there is a relatively extensive literature concerning, on the one hand, the nature of 
smart cities in general terms and the roles of specific actors such as IBM (e.g., Hollands 2008; 
Townsend 2013; McNeill 2015; Söderström et al., 2015), and on the other, the development and 
deployment of specific smart city technologies (e.g., urban operating systems, control rooms, 
smart grids, smart parking, smart waste management, sensor networks, smart lighting, etc.), to 
date there have been relatively few studies that have examined the situated practices as to how 
the smart city as a whole unfolds in specific places (Kitchin 2015). Initial studies include Ayona 
Datta’s (2015) examination of the formation of Dholera City in India; Alan Wiig’s (2016) study 
of Philadelphia’s smart city initiatives; Michelle Cullen’s (2016) examination of Portland, 
Oregon and Dubuque, Iowa; Federico Cugurullo’s (2016) research about the development of 
Masdar, UAE; and a number of studies of Songdo, South Korea (Carvalho 2012; Kim 2014; Shin 
et al. 2015; Shwayri 2013). Interestingly, Dholera, Masdar and Songdo are all new, from-the-
ground-up cities on greenfield sites. Moreover, both Wiig and Cullen’s studies focus on the core 
role played by IBM in initiating smart city programmes. Studies focusing on the situated and 
contextual nature of smart city adoption in existing cities tend to focus on the rollout of specific 
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initiatives and technologies, rather than mapping out the panoply of smart city initiatives and 
how they work (or not) in concert. 
In this paper, we provide a mapping at a city scale of the various smart city initiatives 
underway, how they are managed and governed, and how they are corralled within a smart city 
framework. Such a mapping is important for four reasons. First, it reveals the diverse initiatives 
that make up a smart city and the different configurations of ICT instrumentation and regulation 
devices, policies and economic development strategies, and governance and civic engagement 
practices. Second, it highlights how ‘smart city interventions are always the outcomes of, and 
awkwardly integrated into, existing social and spatial constellations of urban governance and the 
built environment’ (Shelton et al. 2015: 14). Despite the claims of multinational high-tech 
corporations that cities are a tabula rasa for innovation, smart city initiatives are layered onto or 
replace existing city systems and infrastructures, and fit within or rejig organisational structures 
and established modes of practice. Third, it exposes how the development of a smart city is far 
from stable and linear in nature, but rather unfolds through a set of contingent and relational 
processes shaped by local governance practices, political priorities, political economic context, 
and institutional settings. As such, the approach provides situated accounts of how smart cities 
emerge and are designed in practice. Fourth, it illustrates the role of new institutional bodies 
within and across local governments in organising and promoting the smart city agenda. Many 
cities have created new smart city units whose job it is to coordinate smart city initiatives across 
city departments and agencies, but to date the work of these units has been little documented. 
Our empirical case is Dublin, Ireland, charting how Dublin has progressively framed and 
mobilised itself as a smart city. Our principle focus is ‘Smart Dublin’, the city-region’s unit for 
coordinating, managing and promoting its smart city initiatives, and its formative phase in 2015-
2016. In particular, we are interested in how Dublin evolved from what might be described, in 
Paul Dourish’s (2016: 37) terms, as the ‘accidental smart city’ to an ‘articulated smart city’. For 
Dourish, the: 
 
‘story of the accidentally smart city is not of one in which a single strategy and coherent 
design approach yields an urban space in which information is woven into the fabric. 
Instead, the city becomes smart … [in a] piecemeal, gradual, disparate manner … little by 
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little, one piece at a time, under the control of different groups, without a master plan, and 
with a lot of patching, hacking, jury-rigging and settling’ (p. 37).  
 
While the development of a smart city will always remain somewhat ‘accidental’, unfolding 
through a diverse set of initiatives driven by varying actors and stakeholders pursuing different 
interests, in the ‘articulated smart city’ existing initiatives are corralled into the semblance of an 
overarching, coordinated, strategic and branded narrative, into which future smart city initiatives 
are likewise folded. Smart Dublin is the vehicle for creating such an ‘articulated smart city’ in 
Dublin. It should be noted, however, that Dublin’s path to becoming a smart city extends back 
much further than 2014. As we detail in a separate forthcoming paper, a clear path can be traced 
back from Smart Dublin to the innovation and creative city agenda of the 2000s, and to the 
entrepreneurial city agenda of the 1990s, in terms of the underpinning neoliberal ideology and 
some of the actors driving urban development in the city. While we are mindful of this longer 
trajectory, here we are more centrally interested in the period where the city self-declares itself 
‘smart’ and the transition from an ‘accidental’ to ‘articulated’ smart city. 
Our analysis is based on a detailed mapping of the smart city initiatives underway in 
Dublin in 2015 and a set of in-depth interviews and participant observation concerning the 
creation of Smart Dublin. The research started as a collaboration with Dublin City Council as a 
pre-cursor to the formation of Smart Dublin. The task was to conduct an audit of existing smart 
city-related initiatives in the four Dublin local authorities, to undertake interviews with those 
working on these initiatives to better understand their work, and to facilitate ‘challenge’ 
workshops in each of Dublin’s four local authorities (LAs) to identify key issues that a smart city 
approach might address in the Dublin case. The challenge workshops were conducted in late 
2015 and early 2016. Each workshop was opened by a presentation describing the regional scope 
of the initiative, the key concepts underpinning it, and the detailing the desire to identify existing 
smart city initiatives and ‘challenges’ which might be tackled to drive efficiencies and improve 
the lives of citizens. Participants then broke into groups of five to seven, with members from 
different background and competencies from across the organisation, and conducted two 40 
minute sessions of group discussion and debate, moderated by a facilitator. The group 
discussions were structured around a fairly standard classification of smart city technologies 
developed by Giffinger and Pichler-Milanović (2007) and adopted by a number of bodies 
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including the European Union and IEEE (see Table 1). The first session of each workshop sought 
to delineate understandings of what was meant by ‘smart’ from the participants, and then to 
collect examples of smart projects in their local authority based on the classification. During the 
second session, participants suggested and discussed new challenges. After the workshops, 
reports with feedback were prepared, followed by further stakeholder engagement to refine 
priority challenge areas and develop problem statements.  
Following the workshops, we conducted 25 in-depth interviews with a selection of 
projects identified in the audit1. The initiatives selected were those that were already 
mainstreamed and used to deliver city services, and excluded pilot or terminated projects, or 
initiatives that were deemed extremely narrow in scale or serving a very limited audience. A 
further set of seven interviews were conducted for the launch of Smart Dublin to help write case 
studies for the Smart Dublin website and promotional material. Interviews typically lasted 
around an hour and were structured around a series of basic questions. They often also included a 
site visit to view the technologies in operation. Interviewees were drawn from a range of sectors 
(4 academics, 17 LA workers, 5 state agency managers, 5 industry workers, 1 civil society 
worker). Further, one of the authors has also been an external member of the Smart Dublin 
steering group that has met monthly. In addition, the study had access to 42 other interviews 
conducted with smart city stakeholders in Dublin conducted between February and May 2015 as 
part of a sister project undertaken by one of the authors2.  
 
The Dublin region and the ‘accidental smart city’ 
While the Greater Dublin Area covers the counties of Meath, Kildare, and Wicklow, the 
principle core urbanised area is administered by four LAs, covering an area of 920.66 km2, with 
a population of 1,345,402 (Census 2016). These include Dublin City Council (DCC) at its centre, 
Dún Laoghaire Rathdown (DLRCC) and South Dublin (SDCC) County Councils to the south 
and west, and Fingal County Council (FCC) to the north. Each LA is independent and 
autonomous, with its own CEO, service departments, and elected officials. There is no city-wide 
mayor or overarching governance body that coordinates and oversees the four LAs. The Dublin 
Regional Authority had limited powers and was dissolved in 2014 and its replacement, the 
                                                          
1 Labelled SDx in the subsequently quoted interviews 
2 Labelled DSCx in the subsequently quoted interviews 
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Eastern and Midland Regional Assembly, overarches 12 local authorities and similarly has no 
executive function with respect to the day-to-day operation of the four Dublin LAs. The LAs 
mandate is restricted compared to other jurisdictions, covering planning, housing, waste, roads 
and traffic, parks and recreation, and local enterprise, but not health, education, social services or 
public transit, which are delivered through other agencies. While the four Dublin local 
authorities have open channels of communication, collaboration between them is rather limited, 
each focusing on the delivery of services within their respective areas.  
This fragmented governance structure has meant that up until 2014, smart city initiatives 
have largely been pursued individually by each LA. Table 1 details 28 different, mainstreamed, 
operational smart city technologies used by the LAs to manage city services, classified using the 
Giffinger and Pichler-Milanović (2007) typology of smart city initiatives, although it should be 
noted that there is some overlap between categories.3 As the descriptions make clear, the systems 
are broad in scope and seek to address a diverse range of issues. In Table 2 we highlight further 
the similarities and differences between the systems, noting whether they utilise sensor 
technologies, the extent to which they are automated, their generation/use of open data and data 
analytics, the means by which they are citizen engaged and the channels they employ, and the 
form of procurement adopted. Several of the projects incorporate networked sensors, forming 
part of the Internet of Things (IoT). These are more likely to involve forms of algorithmic 
decision-making, with varying degrees of human oversight and involvement. Being ‘in the loop’ 
refers to systems which identify and select profiles and targets, but which do not result in actions 
until a human manually approves; ‘on the loop’ is a system able to create actions based on its 
own analytic functions, but there is an operator in an oversight role that can intervene; and ‘out 
of the loop’ is a fully automated system that acts without human input (Citron and Pasquale 
2014; Kitchin 2016). Examples include Dublin’s traffic control system, SCATS, (Sydney 
Coordinated Adaptive Traffic System) – an intelligent transport system – which utilises inductive 
loops installed under the surface of road junctions to send data about traffic flow into a central 
system that then automatically alters the preconfigured traffic light timings to minimize 
congestion. The smart bins compact rubbish and then report back to a central system in order to 
                                                          
3 We identified over 50 different smart city initiatives, but many were institutional or support-orientated (e.g., 
accelerator programs for tech start-ups working on smart city solutions) rather than technical systems or were 
pilot or research initiatives. 
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schedule an efficient, minimal distance, collection route. In other cases, asset management 
systems, such as fleet monitoring and work scheduling in SDCC, make use of simple algorithms 
to minimise journey times and redirect workers in the field to problems in their area. Such semi-
automated systems are relatively commonplace, with SCATS facilitating automated call-outs to 
engineers to investigate and repair faults in situ. The LEAP transport card, introduced relatively 
late compared to peer cities, calculates fares for multi-modal journeys.4 These activities are 
merely the latest in a series of innovations rolled out in both the public and private sectors, 
notable in some cases because they have been made more visible, such as the case with Real-
time Passenger Information (RTPI) displayed at bus stops. Public bodies and civic communities 
are more likely to take a leading role in web-based, mobile-platform-based, and open data 
initiatives, such as Dublinked and the Dublin Dashboard. In other cases, public bodies could be 
said to be merely furthering the well-established path to e-governance, such as is the case with 
the switch to a Customer Relationship Management (CRM) system in SDCC. This is largely 
standard practice, albeit here with the integration into service delivery systems, such as grass 
cutting route-mapping and public maintenance scheduling. 
The technologies detailed in Tables 1 and 2 are largely proprietary and use varying 
hardware, software, standards, and data formats that can make them incompatible with other 
systems. The initiatives were initiated at different times. For example, although operational since 
1987, the traffic control room has undergone several iterations, with SCATS installed in 1989 
and continually evolving over the past two decades (McCann 2014). Later projects, such as the 
community hackathons and open data portals, are more tied to recent turns more globally to civic 
hacking and open knowledge sharing. Moreover, the systems work across different spatial scales 
– buildings, within LAs, across LAs, city-wide, nationally – due to institutional remits and 
multiple organisational practices. With respect to the national scale, in a relatively small 
European State (population 4.6 million), with no other city-region comparable in size to Dublin 
within its borders, the national scale represents a more efficient investment for technologies such 
as pavement management systems (Map Road PMS), travel smartcards, and real-time passenger 
information systems across major providers. In addition, the initiatives are fragmented not only 
across LAs, but also across departments within those authorities. We interviewed a number of 
                                                          
4 The data from LEAP card users themselves is currently not available and was kept confidential, partly to forestall 
any concerns from the public that might impact on the adoption of the smart travel card (interview, SPD27).  
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staff who did not know of other smart city systems in their own organisation. In other words, the 
systems we document were independently conceived and operated, procured or built to perform a 
particular task but outside of any wider smart city strategy.  
As Paul Dourish (2016) argues, drawing on the work of Edwards and Grinter (2001) on 
the challenges of implementing ubiquitous computing more generally, Dublin had developed as 
‘accidentally smart’, accreting slowly over time without much design intent, rather than being 
smart by design. Indeed, it should also be noted that many of systems detailed in Tables 1 and 2 
were not initiated or funded under the rubric of smart cities and when we interviewed their staff 
they did not consider themselves to be part of a smart city endeavour, but rather working in IT, 
transport, waste management, etc. The four LAs, and the city more broadly, have acquired digital 
capacities slowly and accumulatively, with the various elements not designed to be part of a 
wider whole. Such accretion produces a certain path dependency and legacy systems that are not 
straightforward to append or replace. 
The consequence of this fragmentation and diversity was that until 2015, Dublin, while 
deploying a number of smart city technologies, was not widely thought of as a smart city within 
Dublin or elsewhere (not appearing at the top of international rankings). This was made clear in 
the set of 42 interviews with stakeholders who were overwhelming in their view that Dublin was 
not a leader in becoming a smart city. For example: 
 
‘Well, I suppose I can think of plenty of cities that have done less and I can think of 
plenty of cities that have done more. I don't think I would say we are in the upper third to 
be honest … I think there aren’t that many things you could say on the streets of Dublin 
that you’d be credible saying, ‘we are a leader in smart cities’.’ (DSC24, director, state 
agency) 
 
‘I wouldn't say Dublin is a smart city at all. I would say it wants to be perceived as a 
smart city and it is keen to be an early follower but it is not a leader in any way shape or 
form.’ (DSC9, manager, civic organisation)  
 
Interviewees noted that the smart city landscape was highly fragmented. For example: 
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‘I don’t know where the problem is: is it that everything is fragmented, that there are 
different city councils, different authorities that have to be consulted and different 
boards? If you look, you have DCC, you have Fingal, Dún Laoghaire Rathdown, you 
have got all of these different councils, are they all trying to do different things or are 
they all in agreement or what happens? My personal feeling is that it is a little bit 
fragmented, what goes on in the city. And even from what I am seeing is that there 
is all these different groups doing really cool projects, but we are not all sitting down 
together seeing which are the best ones, which are really applicable now, which can 
we go with now? I used to think it was just bureaucracy but I think actually that it is 
fragmented.’ [SD3, project coordinator, university] 
 
Collectively, interviewees identified a wide-range of issues that they felt was holding 
Dublin back from becoming a smart city, including:  
 
 a piecemeal approach and a lack of a guiding strategy with associated mission and 
goals; 
 an absence of joined-up thinking across LAs, their departments, and other 
stakeholders, and a preponderance of siloed-systems;  
 weak governance structures and an absence of directed leadership;  
 a lack of a formalised process of engagement between LAs, stakeholders and 
others; 
 under-resourcing of investment and weak staffing and skills capacity;  
 an imbalance in the capacity and enthusiasm for LAs and a lack of cooperation 
between LAs to create sufficient scales of economy;  
 inflexibility in the working practices and a staid cultural mindset in LAs with 
respect to procurement, experimentation, and operations; and  
 too many political/regulatory barriers for implementation. 
 
Nonetheless, the majority of interviewees also felt that the city was progressing and, 
moreover, that there were large opportunities to be gained from pursuing a smart city agenda. 
For example: 
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 ‘I don’t think there is a city that is unbelievably advanced in this game, I think it is a real 
emerging space. That is why I think it is such a big opportunity for the city to really grab 
this by the neck and go for it with the right leadership, the right governance, and the right 
partners the opportunity is huge. … We seem to be moving faster than I thought we 
would and I think there is exciting initiatives and projects that are emerging or are under 
way. I think a lot of people would be jealous of the companies we have based here and I 
think maybe we could harness that a bit better in terms of the opportunity and the 
research and the products that they are contemplating.’ (DSC1, LA worker) 
 
Aware of the perception that the city-region was not a leader in smart cities and that there were 
potential opportunities to becoming a smart city and a perceived leader, the four local authorities 
took the collective decision in 2015 to create a smart city unit, articulate a new vision for Dublin 
as a smart city, and brand the city as ‘Smart Dublin’. In so doing, it sought to start a shift from 
Dublin as an ‘accidental’ to ‘articulated’ smart city. 
 
Table 1: Selected smart city initiatives (28 in total) undertaken by or with local authorities 
in the Dublin city region 
 
 Name 
Year 
initiated 
Scale  Description 
Smart economy  
(entrepreneurship, 
innovation) 
Dublinked 2013 City 
Provides access to city datasets, including 
some real-time data feeds 
Smart 
environment 
(green energy, 
sustainability, 
resilience) 
Sonitus sound 
sensing 
2007 
Local 
Authorities 
Network of sound sensors monitoring noise 
levels 
EPA pollution 
monitoring 
2008 Nationwide EPA network of pollution sensors  
Big Belly Bins 2010 
Local 
Authorities 
Networked compactor bins that use sensors to 
monitor levels; waste collection route 
optimisation 
CODEMA + DCC 
energy 
monitoring 
2012 City 
Real-time monitoring of energy use in local 
authority buildings; publicly displayed on 
screens 
Docklands 21 2015 
Local 
Authority 
Locality-based consortium seeking 
sustainability gains. 
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Spatial Energy 
Demand Atlas 
(Codema) 
2015 
Local 
Authority 
Energy use and district-heating feasibility 
mapping. 
Smart government 
(e-gov, open data, 
transparency, 
accountability, 
evidence-informed 
decision making, 
better service 
delivery) 
CRM workflow 
system 
2004 
Local 
Authority 
Customer relations management system used 
to interface with the public and undertake 
workflow planning. 
Fleet 
Management 
2010 
Local 
Authority 
GPS tracking of local authority fleets and route 
optimisation. 
Public realm 
operations map 
2010 
Local 
Authority 
An interactive map that reports scheduled 
public works. 
Fix-your-street 2011 Nationwide 
A website and app for reporting issues (e.g. 
vandalism, dumping, potholes) to local 
authorities. 
Map Road PMS 2011 Nationwide 
National pavement management system for 
road maintenance. 
Lexicon Library 2014 Building 
New build library with smart control systems 
and digital services. 
Smart living 
(quality of life, 
safety, security, 
management of 
risk) 
 
Map Alerter / 
Unfolding News 
2010 
Local 
Authorities 
Real-time alerts for weather and flooding. 
Dublin Dashboard 2013 City 
Comprehensive set of interactive graphs and 
maps of city data, including real-time data, as 
well location-based services. 
Smart Stadium 2015 Building 
Sensor network monitoring different facets of 
stadium use. 
Smart mobility 
(intelligent 
transport systems, 
multi-modal inter-
op, efficiency) 
Traffic Control 
Room 
1987 
Local 
Authority 
A suite of different technologies including 
SCATS (transduction loops at junctions), CCTV, 
ANPR (automatic number plate recognition 
cameras), detection of breaking red lights at 
Luas (tram) lines, feeding into a centralised 
traffic control room. 
ANPR 2005 
Local 
Authority 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition for data 
analytics on traffic volumes, both local and 
passing through area. 
E-flow road 
tolling 
2008 City 
Automated roll tolling/billing using 
transponders. 
Dublin Bikes 2009 
Local 
Authority 
Public hire bike scheme. 
Leapcard 2011 Nationwide 
Smart card access/payment for trains, buses 
and trams. 
RTPI 2011 Nationwide 
Digital displays at bus and tram stops and train 
stations providing information on the 
arrival/departure time of services. 
Insight ICT 2013 
Local 
Authority 
Data analytics system with crowdsourcing, 
integrated into traffic system. 
Smart people 
(creativity, 
inclusiveness, 
empowerment, 
participation) 
 
TOG 2009 City Civic hacking coding meetups. 
Fingal Open Data 2010 
Local 
Authority 
Local authority open data sets. 
CIVIQ / 
Citizenspace 
2012 
Local 
Authority 
Web consultation for planning documents and 
other policy proposals. 
Code for Ireland 2013 Nationwide Civic hacking coding meetups. 
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Geohive 2015 Nationwide 
Open spatial data website, facilitating 
customised maps. 
 
Table 2: The characteristics of the selected smart city initiatives in Dublin 
 
 Feedback 
loops 
Data usage  
Name Sensor in on out open 
data 
data 
analytics 
citizen 
engagement 
Procurement 
ANPR Y . . . . x . Direct procurement 
Big Belly Bins Y . x x . x . Direct procurement 
CIVIQ / Citizenspace . . . . x . web Direct procurement 
Code for Ireland . . . . x x community Civic voluntarism 
CODEMA + DCC energy 
monitoring 
Y x . . . x report Directive-driven 
CRM workflow system . x x . . x Public service Internal 
Docklands 21 Y . . . . . radio / social 
media 
Gov-ind collab 
Dublin Bikes Y . x x . x app / web / 
public service 
Direct procurement 
Dublin Dashboard . . . . x x web / API Gov-res collab 
Dublinked . . . . x . data portal Gov-res collab 
E-flow road tolling Y . . x . x Web / public 
service  
  
EPA pollution monitoring Y x . . x x . Directive-driven 
Fingal Open Data . . . . x . web Internal 
Fix-your-street . x . . x x web / app Internal 
Fleet Management Y x x . . x . Internal 
Geohive . . . . x x Web Internal 
Insight ICT Y x . . . x . Gov-res collab 
Leapcard Y . x x . x app / web / 
public service 
Gov-ind collab 
Lexicon Library Y x x x . x . Architectural 
Map Alerter / Unfolding 
News 
. x x . . x app Direct procurement 
Map Road PMS . . x . . x . Gov-ind collab 
Public realm operations 
map 
. . . . . . web Internal 
RTPI Y . x x x x app / web / API Gov-ind collab 
Smart Stadium Y . x x . x . Gov-res-ind collab 
Sonitus sound sensing Y x . . x x web / API Gov-res-ind collab 
Spatial Energy Demand 
Atlas (Codema) 
Y . . . . x radio / social 
media 
Gov-NPC collab 
TOG . . . . x x community Civic voluntarism 
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Traffic Control Room Y x x x x x radio / social 
media 
Gov-ind collab 
 
Smart Dublin and the articulated smart city 
Smart Dublin has its origins in the foundation of Dublinked, a shared open data repository. 
Dublinked was established in 2011 as a shared initiative of the four Dublin LAs. It was as 
initially framed as an economic innovation initiative (it would fuel an open data economy), and 
was co-owned by the four local authorities and Maynooth University, with IBM supplying the 
technology platform. Each LA transferred funding into a central pot to fund Dublinked’s 
activities and core staffing. Dublinked is still an active collaborative project and given its focus 
and already existing institutional structure, governance and funding arrangements, it became the 
foundation base for establishing Smart Dublin, along with the smart city program manager role 
in DCC, which was created in 2013, reporting directly to the CEO. Prior to Smart Dublin’s 
launch in March 2016, the Dublinked staff and its steering committee (which met once a month), 
along with DCC’s smart city program manager, took on the role of establishing the new 
initiative. After the launch, Dublinked, while maintaining its own branding, was subsumed into 
the Smart Dublin organisational structure. While a city-region body, Smart Dublin is housed in 
Dublin City Council’s Chief Executive’s Office and presently consists of four core staff 
members. 5 Its organisation structure is set out in Figure 2. The steering committee is comprised 
of two members of staff from each LA, one more technical, the other more service or enterprise 
focused, and it is chaired by one of the LA CEOs. It has appointed an advisory network, 
comprising of 40 stakeholders representing industry, government, civil society and academia, 
which has met once prior to the time of writing (April 2017).  
 
  
                                                          
5 Smart Dublin Regional Manager, Smart Dublin Regional Coordinator, Smart Dublin technical lead/ data lead and 
Smart Dublin community manager. 
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Figure 2: The organisational structure of Smart Dublin 
 
 Source: Smart Dublin Regional Group 
 
While Smart Dublin has a particular focus and remit, it is the latest in a series of 
initiatives in Dublin to stimulate the growth of creative, scientific and technological clusters in 
the city, and foster partnerships between technology and design firms, research institutions, and 
the State (prior initiatives include Design Dublin, Creative Dublin Alliance, Innovation Dublin, 
Pivot Dublin). Its primary aim is to increase the visibility of existing smart city-related initiatives 
in the city region, and stimulate new partnerships and city services. Its present remit covers 
promoting the use of data-driven networked infrastructure, fostering economic growth and 
entrepreneurship, and creating citizen-centric initiatives, with a particular focus on producing 
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more efficient city services, improving transportation flows, tackling flooding and other 
environmental concerns, attracting inward investment and encouraging indigenous start-ups and 
SMEs, and opening data and encouraging civic engagement. It seeks to do this in a context of a 
limited role for the public sector in urban transformation due to the recent recession, related 
austerity measures, and the commensurate need to reduce the costs of public services. As a 
governmental unit, Smart Dublin provides a central hub for managing relations with companies 
and university research institutes wishing to partner with the four local authorities on smart city 
initiatives, and a core role of the unit is fostering economic innovation and promoting Dublin as 
an open, engaged business location that will accommodate urban testbedding and trialling. It 
seeks in part to do this by leveraging on the high-tech ecosystem formed by multinationals, 
SMEs and start-up companies settled in Ireland. Indeed, as they state: ‘We aim to position 
Dublin as a world leader in the development of new urban solutions, using open data, and with 
the city region as a test bed.’ Smart Dublin’s objectives are to: 
 
 ‘To stimulate the economic competitiveness of the Dublin Region, through 
collaboration between private, public and academic partners; 
 To drive public sector efficiencies and improve services by using the Smart 
Dublin platform to call out for innovative solutions to identified city region 
challenges; 
 To promote transparency and open government through the publication of local 
government data on the Dublinked open data portal in open, free and reusable 
formats.’6 
 
It continues by arguing that the benefits accrued through Smart Dublin are that it: ‘acts as 
a reference site to validate smart city technologies; move from research to reality; builds a 
collaboration framework to solve Dublin’s challenges; delivers more efficient and responsive 
city services; increased engagement with citizens and service users; [and] enhances the quality of 
life.’ Part of the narrative supporting the work of Smart Dublin is that local authorities are behind 
the technology-curve with respect to state-of-the-art ideas and systems for managing cities. They 
                                                          
6 http://smartdublin.ie/about/ 
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lack the core skills, knowledges, resources and capacities to address pressing urban issues and 
maintain critical services and infrastructures, which are becoming more socially and technically 
complex and require multi-tiered specialist interventions. Moreover, their procurement processes 
and regulations are outmoded and not fit for purpose. Instead, they need to draw on the 
competencies held within industry (such as large global consultancies and the producers of 
software and hardware solutions) that possess sufficient expertise to guide city administrators 
and can deliver better city services through public-private partnerships, leasing, deregulation and 
market competition, or outright privatization (Kitchin et al., 2017). Within this mindset, the place 
of the public sector is to challenge companies to offer solutions to set problems, and foster 
innovation and entrepreneurship with an open data policy and new ways of tendering. As such, 
what Smart Dublin provides is the bridge to source such expertise and build partnerships to keep 
abreast of the technology-curve and create efficiencies in public service delivery, all the while 
fostering a local innovation economy.   
The new ‘smart city ecosystem’ created and promoted through Smart Dublin builds on 
the slogan “Open, Engaged, Connected”: open as in open data, engaged as in engaged citizens 
and connected as in a connected city (joined-up and networked). In particular, Smart Dublin has 
pursued four tactics designed to foster ‘smartness’, marking a significant change in how Dublin 
tackles urban issues and innovation. 
First, it has sought to create a formalized approach to engagement with stakeholders and 
prepare a smart city strategy. Prior to the formation of Smart Dublin there was a sense that 
companies and universities were formulating initiatives and the city’s administration was 
reactive to proposals, rather the four LAs driving the smart city agenda around their requirements 
and those of citizens. Moreover, there was no formalised process of engagement between 
stakeholders, with some having better access to decision-making networks than others, with 
decisions being made on an ad hoc basis. As detailed by two of our interviewees:  
 
‘I think it would be extremely difficult … to get into DCC. I think the rigidity of policies 
and procurement and stuff within the council is probably the weakest point in the smart 
cities thing, they are not flexible enough for it. … I personally have had dealings with the 
council and I personally have contacts in there and I know, not necessarily who I have to 
talk to, but I know who I have to ask to be told who I have to talk to, and most people in 
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Dublin don’t have that privilege. So, if you are not somebody who has had any 
interactions with them it is a very, very difficult place to put down any sort of a foothold.’ 
(DSC12, leader, civic organisation)  
 
‘If you were IBM or Intel you can kind of walk through the front door but anybody else, 
they don't know the route or the procedure or...’ (DSC23, local authority worker) 
  
The result was a set of projects that suited stakeholders but little served the city, and which were 
implemented in an arbitrary way. In response to this, Smart Dublin now provides the four local 
authorities with a single point of contact for all smart city proposals – a ‘front door’ through 
which everyone enters – and a framing and procedure for evaluating each proposal in an equal 
and transparent manner. In November 2016 two sub-committees of the Smart Dublin steering 
group were formed to produce: (1) a formal procedure for engagement that sets out the process, 
timelines, and obligations with respect to Smart Dublin and those seeking engagement7; (2) a 
draft smart city strategy for discussion at the next advisory network meeting. Smart Dublin has 
thus been a vehicle for the four LAs to take a more active role in shaping the smart city agenda 
for the city. 
Second, it has embraced test-bedding as a means to undertake urban development. Test-
bedding is often synonymous with urban “living-labs” and has been introduced within 
engineering literature “to describe a controlled and often isolated development environment in 
which to test the operability of new technologies, processes, or theories for large systems” 
(Halpern et al., 2013). Applied to cities, urban space becomes a distributed laboratory in which 
to test smart city technologies, especially those utilising IoT, creating test sites run by public and 
private stakeholder to help solve city challenges, but also to attract investment. In the Dublin 
case, the city allows an “exploration of smart city solutions in a space small enough to trial but 
large enough to prove”8.  
                                                          
7 The initial draft of this procedure was drafted by one of the authors and was subsequently modified by other sub-
committee and steering group members. 
8 The definition, firstly introduced by the Croke Park Smart Stadium consortium, has been adopted by several 
initiatives, included Smart Dublin, so that it became a sort of ‘motto’ for smart city practicioners and IoT advocates 
(e.g. https://www.siliconrepublic.com/machines/iot-ida-ireland-leo-clancy) 
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Dublin hosts test-beds in several domains, including flood management, crowd 
management, air quality and sound monitoring, mobility, smart lighting, and low-power wide 
area networks. Larger initiatives include the Smart Stadium centred on Croke Park (an 80,000 
seater venue) where a number of companies are trialling sensor and camera technologies for 
managing the stadium infrastructure, the pitch, concession stalls, and crowds, as well as the fan 
experience of an event (Panchanathan et al. 2016), and the newly designated ‘smart district’, an 
area for trialling new smart city technologies such as sensor networks, smart lighting, smart 
parking, and smart grids (Heaphy and Pétercsák 2016). The latter is part of the Docklands SDZ 
(Strategic Development Zone), an area that is home to a number of high-tech firms, including the 
European headquarters of Google, Facebook and LinkedIn, as well as numerous tech start-ups 
and incubator spaces such as Dogpatch Labs. The ‘smart district’ has been the cornerstone of a 
bid by DCC for an EU Lighthouse project, which would provide several million euros of 
investment if successful. 
 
‘The strategy of test-bedding depends on relatively small dimension of the Irish capital: 
Dublin is a nice small community to work in, to start on a scale and then, when we 
have something right, we can take it somewhere else. We will start a trial soon in New 
York City and that has the potential to be much, much bigger. But we have the 
understanding of what it takes from having a nice local small scale here, and we have 
a very clear picture so that when we go to talk to somebody new they can see that we 
understand the problems or understand what is needed.’ (SD30, start-up entrepreneur) 
 
From the Smart Dublin perspective, test-bed urbanism is an opportunity to scale from the bench 
and lab to the street and urban environments, and to collaborate with other like-minded 
operations, including start-ups, SMEs and multinationals. The aim is twofold: to draw in 
investments and actors who are developing new technologies, and to deliver new and more 
efficient services. 
 
‘Now what the city government should do, in my opinion … is two things. They should 
obviously look at how it can test, exploit and deploy technology solutions to improve 
lighting, to improve traffic management, to improve flood safety. But then it should 
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also look at how it can actually play at the edges of all that to allow universities to do 
research and businesses to test market products that they could have developed 
somewhere else but they want to see them in a real-life scenario.’ (DSC5, 
administrator, local authority) 
 
However, it also recognizes that test-bed urbanism is an open-ended model based on 
experimentation, uncertainties and trials (Halpern et. al. 2013). Dublin is no exception: 
 
‘But again it is about building up slowly and not just leaping in and trying to put out a 
massive network of sensors and then go, what are we going to use them for? [...] It 
should be about iteration. We should be able to put out some relatively small numbers, 
learn from them. And you will, you will learn loads of stuff about what is going right, 
what is going wrong.’ (SD30, start-up entrepreneur) 
 
The indefinite endpoint and progressive re-adaptation make test-bedding consistent with the 
future-oriented nature of Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP), particularly in the form of 
‘procurement by challenge’ and Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR), which is the third 
tactic Smart Dublin is adopting. PCP has been recently adopted by the EU to foster ideas where a 
substantial amount of research and development is still needed to obtain a final product or 
service. 9 The process does not presuppose the optimal solution to a problem for which tenders 
are then sought, but rather seeks a range of solutions from which one will be selected. In many 
cases, an already established market solution does not exist, with the selected solution needing to 
be developed from an idea through to product. Usually the process is divided into four phases. 
First, a ‘challenge’ is identified and a competition initiated. Second, the submitted solutions are 
evaluated and whittled down to four to six proposed solutions that the judging panel determine 
have potential value and utility. Each of the entities developing these solutions are given seed 
                                                          
9“By definition, pre-commercial procurement is limited to the “pre-commercial” phase of an innovative product’s 
lifecycle, while the commercialization phase is left in the hands of private firms and agents [...] This does not rule 
out the possibility (i) of a prototype or a test series being produced during the pre-commercial phase; and (ii) of 
the public procurer being among the purchasers of the commercialized good/service (or even the only purchaser, 
in the event of an exclusive development contractual clause)” (Petrella 2013). 
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funding to continue to work on and prototype their solution. Third, a further round of judging 
takes place to identify the solution that is most likely to best address the challenge proposed. The 
successful initiative is given a further round of funding to develop their solution to a market 
product. Fourth, the LA decides whether to procure that product for mainstream use in the 
management of the city. Administered in this way, procurement by challenge acts as a stimulus 
to innovation, business and product creation. The project is inherently risky to both the procurer 
and developer as ultimately a solution for a problem might not be achieved. Despite this risk, the 
venture is considered worthwhile because it supports an innovation economy. 
Smart Dublin has actively embraced the procurement by challenge approach to urban 
innovation and finding solutions to issues that Dublin faces. To fund PCP, Smart Dublin has 
successfully applied for SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) funds from Enterprise 
Ireland (the state agency responsible for developing and supporting indigenous companies). 
SBIR operates under EU pre-commercial procurement rules and is a pan-government, structured 
process, enabling the public sector to engage with companies, especially start-up companies 
operating in the high-tech sector.10 To date, one ‘challenge’ is significantly underway, focused 
on increasing cycling take-up in Dublin, making it safer, more sociable and secure.11 Three more 
focused on illegal dumping of waste, flood management, and assisted wayfinding have been 
launched in April 2017.  
Lastly, Smart Dublin is seeking to leverage a scale change: a shift from localized 
authorities to the Dublin city-region scale as a joint endeavour of the four LAs. This scaling 
helps to bridge the fragmenting of governance and administration across the city and facilitates 
the sharing of knowledge between actors. By providing a one-shop stop for all stakeholders 
interested in smart city initiatives for Dublin, Smart Dublin acts as a broker between companies, 
universities and the local authorities. While most attention is usually directed at DCC, which 
covers the the city centre, Smart Dublin informs stakeholders of opportunities with the other LAs 
and can provide introductions. A shift in scale also potentially creates scales of economy for 
financing and implementing smart city technologies that work optimally at city-scale, rather than 
                                                          
10SBIR (Rigby et al. 2012) aims to support the Public Sector to address challenges through innovation in products and 
services. SBIR projects are 100% funded, create a lead/R&D customer, provides accountability for funders and 
the IP is owned by companies that are free to develop and sell their innovations in global markets. 
11 Out of the 93 application received, 21 have been audited, 5 selected for the first phase of funding (12.500 euros 
each) and 4 selected for the second phase of funding (25.000 euros each). 
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in localised areas. A further two scalar transformations are also occurring. The first is to an all-
island scale through the All-Ireland Smart City Forum (launched December 9th, 2016) that 
includes all the major cities of Ireland, and possibly those of Northern Ireland too, in order to 
share best practices, coordinate projects and tenders, and make collective bids for funding. The 
second is international and involvement in an EU H2020 project, an Urbact project (EU 
European Regional Develop Fund), a lead participant in a EU lighthouse project bid, and 
membership of TM Forum (an organisation that promotes the use of digital business in general 
across government, including smart cities) that involves collaboration with other city 
administrations in Europe and with businesses globally. 
Thus conceived, Smart Dublin is an effort to coordinate, build and extend innovation 
networks in Dublin, closely linked to multinationals, the active start-up community, and state-
funded drives to support local enterprises. Indeed, it is important to note that Smart Dublin has 
no control over the many smart city initiatives across the four local authorities. Rather its role is 
one of articulation (creating a smart city narrative and strategy), initiation (introducing and 
seeding new potential projects, partnerships, and systems into the four local authorities), and 
promotion (selling the idea that Dublin is a smart city and is open for smart city initiatives and 
businesses). These serve four main purposes. First, addressing and removing some of the barriers 
that were creating fragmentation and holding Dublin back from becoming a smart city, such as a 
lack of cooperation, joined-up thinking, weak governance and leadership, and an absence of 
formalized engagement. Second, creating, promoting and maintaining a discourse where private 
and civic initiatives in the Dublin region can coalesce. Third, putting Dublin ‘on the map’ of 
global smart cities. Fourth, providing a platform for engagement with new tendering practices.  
 
From ‘accidental to ‘articulated’ smart city? 
At the time of writing, it is a year since Smart Dublin’s formal launch and couple of years since 
its inception. In that time, with a small team and limited resources, Smart Dublin has started to 
shift Dublin from being a purely accidental smart city to an articulated one; that is, from a 
situation in which there were various disconnected and uncoordinated smart city initiatives, to 
one where there is a narrative placed around those initiatives and there is a unit whose role it is to 
envisage and help realise Dublin as a smart city. Its orientation to this process of articulation has 
very much been focused around economic and urban development, practising a form of tech-led 
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innovation entrepreneurial urbanism in which city assets are used to increase competitiveness, 
attract inward investment, and foster indigenous start-ups and SMEs. In many senses, Smart 
Dublin is remaking the actually existing accidental smart city in a new form through testbedding, 
procurement by challenge, and scaling. Here, Dublin as a smart city is being articulated as ‘open, 
engaged, connected’, but how this plays out on-the-ground is somewhat different to that hoped 
for. Rather than the smart city being ‘open as in open data’, ‘engaged as in engaged citizens’, and 
‘connected as in a connected city’, it is ‘open as in open ended or open market’, ‘engaged as in 
otherwise engaged’, and ‘connected as in loosely coupled’.  
Testbedding and procurement by challenge are explicitly open-ended, ad hoc processes, 
seeking to foster innovation and creativity, and to conceive, build and test new urban solutions 
iteratively. Smart Dublin is actively pursuing ‘experimental urbanism’ (Evans et al. 2016) as an 
economic growth and urban development strategy, offering companies access to city services, 
infrastructures and personnel in a form very different to the usual relationship between 
companies and city administrations. While the process of testing and trialling is supposedly 
meant to be leading to fully implemented and mainstreamed systems, investments in 
experimental urbanism runs the risk of parts of the city becoming eternal ‘beta versions’. Of 
course, cities are always in the process of becoming, unfolding in time and space as a diverse set 
of processes that shape city life and urban development. However, city administrations usually 
seek stability and certainty, updating systems as and when needed, rather than encouraging 
continual flux and first-mover risks in adopting urban technology. With respect to the latter, 
urban spaces and city management are further repositioned as open markets in which companies 
can co-create and work with the State, deepening and further legitimating the marketization and 
public-private provision/privatization of city services and infrastructure. Rather than the city 
being a place which facilitates and hosts markets, with local government and state agencies being 
the main provider of services, the city itself becomes a market and corporate laboratory, with 
services increasingly being delivered privately. Such a repositioning raises the question of for 
whom is the smart city is being developed? What is the role of the State in urban development? 
How does the smart city unfold in practice through public and private means? In the case of 
Smart Dublin these normative questions have little been considered or debated beyond 
formulating broad mission statements and goals. Rather the smart urban development agenda is 
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being driven by a relatively narrow instrumental agenda aimed at addressing specific issues and 
fostering economic development. 
While Smart Dublin professes to engage citizens, with citizens being considered its ‘most 
important component’, its focus on test-bedding and procurement by challenge has meant that in 
practice it has been almost exclusively engaged with companies, other state agencies, and 
departments in the LAs. Indeed, Smart Dublin has mostly been focused on building a platform to 
enable market collaboration and supporting economic growth and competitiveness. In part, the 
emphasis on economic development has been driven by a strong government emphasis on job 
creation and economic recovery post-financial crisis. Facilitating urban test-bedding is 
positioned as a strategic asset to attract inward investment and procurement by challenge is 
supported by a government funding stream. In addition, the loss of resources, staff and expertise 
within the public sector in the wake of the crisis necessitates a turn towards the market for ideas, 
labour and solutions. Given this limited capacity, the market is seen as a much more likely 
source for innovation and workable solutions than citizens. Moreover, given already existing 
relationships and the ecosystem of companies and incubators, engagement with the private sector 
is easier to manage and more straightforward. In contrast, interacting with citizens and civic 
associations is more complex. 
In other words, there has been a pragmatic approach taken as to whom to engage with 
given government priorities and Smart Dublin’s own limited capacity. This has meant that 
citizens are only the ‘most important component’ in the sense that ultimately, they will be the 
beneficiaries of the smart city – receiving better services. Indeed, the role of citizens in Smart 
Dublin is presently one of user or consumer or tester, but not consultant, participant, proposer, 
co-creator or decision-maker. Indeed, to date there has been little attempt to actively engage 
citizens with respect to Smart Dublin’s work: there is no sense that test-bedding has been 
undertaken in partnership with local communities or that citizens are actively consulted in 
identifying the challenges to be addressed through the SBIR programme. As such, with regards 
to citizens Smart Dublin has defaulted to operating a form of civic paternalism and stewardship 
deciding on what is best for and acting on behalf of citizens (Cardullo and Kitchin, 2017). And 
despite the ambition to become more citizen-centric, the marginal status of citizens in creating 
the smart city is likely to remain in the absence of additional capacities and competencies of 
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Smart Dublin to engage meaningfully with them, or an agenda driven by normative rather than 
instrumental concerns. 
While Smart Dublin spans the four local authorities and in principle could act as a 
coordinator of smart city initiatives within and across these bodies, to date it has concentrated its 
focus on creating connections with and between companies and university research institutes. In 
this sense, it has created connections, but they are outward facing linkages rather than inward. 
Moreover, given the heterogeneity of actors (start-ups, corporations, public agencies, 
universities, etc.), the mutable nature of markets, and the lack of capacity and leadership, rather 
than a producing a highly and tightly connected network Smart Dublin works within a loosely 
coupled ecosystem (Weick 1995). Such an ecosystem is characterised as being without central 
coordination nor strict rules, where there are many solutions to challenges, processes are 
distributed in a dense network of connections, and feedback is not immediate. Smart Dublin 
seeks to be a facilitator within these loose couplings, organizing and sponsoring meetings, 
running events and schemes, providing funding and space, and acting as a broker between actors. 
It makes Dublin’s ecosystem visible and at the same time acts as a platform for it. However, the 
looseness of arrangements mean that the network lacks coordination and direction, meaning that 
how the activities unfold can be haphazard and dependent on particular individuals rather than 
structures and formalised processes. As such, the scale and success of initiatives is variable 
according to the relations and actors that are activated around specific challenges, technologies 
and solutions.  
One issue that is significantly shaping the formation and geography of new smart city 
initiatives in the city is a large imbalance in the enthusiasm, commitment and resourcing by the 
four LAs. While each local authority has smart city initiatives, DCC has by far the most number 
of staff interested in and actively applying the smart city approach, and the greatest number of 
projects and connections with companies. They were the initiators of test-bed urbanism within 
the city as well as of the pre-commercial forms of procurement, and are driving those agendas. 
They are also the largest and wealthiest LA given the business rates generated by the city centre 
location. What this has meant is that Smart Dublin is dominated by DCC and the organisation 
sometimes suffers with the associated politics and disharmony that go with this imbalance, such 
as difficulties in agreeing on courses of action. 
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The orientation of Smart Dublin towards economic development and innovation has 
meant Dublin is being articulated as a smart city in particular way. However, while the approach 
adopted produces a narrative of Dublin as a smart city and has been successful in terms of 
encouraging innovation, building relationships with companies and universities, and starting to 
establish an international profile needed to secure large-scale EU smart city funding, it does very 
little to address the accidental nature of existing smart city initiatives, which remain largely 
disconnected and uncoordinated. Moreover, somewhat ironically, the approach of using 
testbedding and new forms of procurement further produces a fragmented landscape of ever-
evolving projects and initiatives that are in continual flux. These testbed and procurement related 
projects possess coordination in so much as they are facilitated by Smart Dublin, but they are not 
interlinked through some grand design or master plan that addresses issues of interoperability 
between systems and alignment of work and processes with existing initiatives.  Indeed, most are 
pilot projects that will not be mainstreamed in the short term. Further, while new forms of 
procurement potentially make the public sector more agile and responsive to market solutions, it 
also makes it more fragile in two ways. First, it further delegate responsibility for the delivery of 
city services to the private sector. Second, due to their reliance on networked software, the 
technical solutions procured are potentially insecure, brittle and open to hacking (Kitchin and 
Dodge 2017). As such, Dublin is set to continue being an accidental smart city, albeit one whose 
accidental nature is veiled by Smart Dublin. In this regard, it will not be exceptional. As Paul 
Dourish (2016) notes, every city is an accidental smart city, though some are more articulated, 
and some more coordinated, than others.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have examined the accidental nature of smart city development and how the 
diverse processes and initiatives of smart cities are corralled within an articulated narrative to 
produce a more coherent sense of the smart city landscape forming. Our case example has been 
Dublin, Ireland, and the formation of Smart Dublin, a unit co-owned by four LAs whose remit is 
to articulate a smart city narrative and strategy, initiate new projects and partnerships and attract 
funding and inward investment, and promote the work of the Dublin LAs within and beyond 
Ireland with respect to smart cities. As with all existing cities that are utilising ICT in their 
management and governance and delivery of city services and infrastructures, our mapping of 
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the various smart city initiatives at work in Dublin reveals that they were deployed in an ad hoc, 
piecemeal, uncoordinated manner. There was no smart city master plan. In fact, there was very 
little coordination or even awareness of initiatives across departments with LAs or between LAs. 
Smart Dublin has sought, in part, to address this accidental nature and to create a more 
articulated and coordinated smart city landscape. However, while Smart Dublin has been 
successful in creating a smart city narrative and branding Dublin as a smart city, it has taken a 
very particular path in this process, focusing strongly on economic and urban development. To a 
large degree, Smart Dublin operates as an economic support unit, forming partnerships with 
companies and universities to facilitate urban testbedding and attract inward investment, and 
experimenting with procurement by challenge to foster innovation, new smart city products, and 
new business formation. It has little addressed the existing accidental and uncoordinated nature 
of Dublin as a smart city and in many ways actively contributes to that accidental nature through 
proliferating smart city projects that are largely uncoordinated and non-interoperable beyond a 
shared, overarching narrative. The accidental smart city then continues to be produced, despite 
the attempts to create a more articulated vision. 
The contribution of this analysis to understanding the smart city is threefold. First, we 
have demonstrated the importance of mapping the whole smart city landscape within an urban 
domain. Such a mapping reveals that despite the rhetoric of smart city initiatives breaking down 
silos and producing more coordinated, integrated city services, in reality initiatives are largely 
conceived and built in a gradual, piecemeal manner by different parties, and are deployed under 
the control of varying actors. Few cities so far have developed smart city strategies or 
masterplans, and despite the projected hopes of urban operating systems, integrated control 
rooms, and smart city standards initiatives, the smart city will largely continue, we believe, to be 
accidental rather than by design. No doubt, integrating solutions, standards and strategies will 
produce a degree of coordination and interoperability, but it will not be able to tame and corral 
all the stakeholders, actors and technologies at play in the city into a unified whole. As such, the 
articulated smart city will always to be that, an articulation: a narrative to create a particular 
impression and to attract attention and investment. It will always remain to some degree 
accidental. 
Second, we have demonstrated the role of the political and administrative geography of a 
city in the development of smart cities. In particular, we have highlighted how the fragmented 
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nature of Dublin’s local government into four autonomous jurisdictions contributed to the 
accidental nature of its smart city initiatives. The solution to this fractious governance was the 
formation of a unit that cut across all four LAs, with a shared budget and staff. However, while 
the unit does overarch the LAs, it has no executive powers of coordination, only able to lobby 
LA departments to embrace the ideas and ideals of smart cities and use Smart Dublin to promote 
Dublin as a smart city. To date, there has been very little political geography analysis of the 
smart city beyond a number of studies that examined the modes of governmentality enacted 
through smart city technologies (e.g., Klauser et al. 2014; Vanolo 2014; Sadowski and Pasquale 
2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2016). And yet it is clear that the administrative geography can 
have a profound effect on the deployment of smart city technologies that need to work at scale or 
across stakeholders. For example, transport solutions such as integrated smart ticketing, smart 
parking and bike-share need to cover entire functional territories and all suppliers. It is unfeasible 
that citizens would be expected to transfer between different bike systems at municipal 
boundaries or have different smart cards for different transport providers. Moreover, it means 
that there can marked differences in the smart city services that citizens have access to in 
different jurisdictions. This is the case in Dublin, but is particularly striking in another of our 
case studies, where the number and scope of smart city initiatives across the 101 municipalities 
in the Greater Boston area is highly uneven and there is little to no cooperation and sharing 
between jurisdictions. In part, this issue has been ignored because studies have focused on single 
technologies within single jurisdictions.  
Third, we have documented the process by which an accidental smart city starts to 
become an articulated one and the role played by specialist smart city units. Smart Dublin’s role 
is explicitly to produce a smart city strategy and narrative, to liaise and work with companies, 
universities and other LA departments and public sector agencies, and to seek new solutions for 
issues facing LAs and citizens; it is to create an articulated smart city. It is highly active in this 
regard, acting as a key node in the advocacy coalition for smart cities (Kitchin et al., 2017) 
operating in the city, and liasing and working with international partners. Given limited 
resources and a wider context of government prioritising job creation and the priorities of 
companies, Smart Dublin is pursuing becoming an articulated smart city through an economic 
development agenda that utilises test-bedding and procurement by challenge, but as yet pays 
little attention to meaningful citizen engagement. As a shared unit across four LAs, Smart Dublin 
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is somewhat pioneering in the Dublin context, creating a distinct form of governance. The unit 
has quickly gained visibility across departments in the four LAs though the challenge workshops 
it has organized, and it has gained some international visibility. It acts a conduit for mobile 
policy concerning smart cities into the four LAs and as a broker for projects between 
stakeholders and LAs.  
It is clear from our analysis that to more fully understand the rollout of smart city 
initiatives around the world there is a need for two complementary sets of studies that 
supplement the raft of studies focusing on the rollout of specific technologies or initiatives in 
particular locations. First, there needs to be empirical case studies of the evolving smart city 
landscape across entire city-regions, the interrelationships between smart city initiatives, the role 
of political and administrative geographies in shaping the development of the actually existing 
smart city, and the formation and work of smart city units. Clearly, such research can draw on 
the rich tradition of urban policy and practice research to contextualise and help make sense of 
what is the same or different about the drive to create smart cities. Second, there needs to be a set 
of comparative studies examining how the smart city landscape is taking shape in different cities 
around the world and starts to make sense of general patterns and localised contingencies. It is 
clear from the analysis conducted to date that the creation of smart cities has taken different 
paths and forms across the globe, varying as a function of political, economic and legal context, 
culture, governance, legacy infrastructures, policy priorities, administrative geographies, and 
interconnections and interdependencies with other places. Little is known, as yet, as to the 
specificities of these differences and their effects, and yet smart city technologies are still being 
developed and marketed as universal solutions to urban issues. 
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